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ANNOUNCEMENT.
The Review announces the election of Irwin F. Holt of the
Third Year Class to the Editorial Board.

NOTES
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TRUST UNDER FEDERAL

TAX LAw-The appearance of the word "association" in numerous
statutes, and the absence of any generally recognized and exact conception of the scope of that term 2 has been the fountain of much
vigorous litigation in recent years. A body of persons whose status
is not covered exactly by the terms "corporation," "joint stock company," "insurance company" or "partnership," faces a real and very
practical difficulty each time it is obliged to file a return under the Federad Revenue Act." A Massachusetts or business trust is just such
a body.' Occupying a position midway between corporations and
partnerships on one hand, and pure trusteeships on the other, there
'The Federal Revenue Acts, Anti-trust Law, Firm Name Statutes, Blue
Sky Laws and Uniform Partnership Act, are some examples. The Federal

Bankruptcy Act uses the words "unincorporated company" which have by judicial definition been made equivalent to "association." In re Associated Trust,
222 Fed. Io=a (D. C. Mass. 1914). Cf. United Mine Workers v. Colorado Coal
Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
"The term 'association' has not acquired a technical legal meaning which
can safely be stated in the form of a definition. In philosophy of law it has
been used sometimes to describe all cohesive groups of individuals whether or
not endowed by the state with the conception of artificial entity." WRIGHTNGTON,
UNINcoasPoRATED AssocIATIoNS AND BUsINEss TRUSTS (2d ed. 1923) 1.
"Section I of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 STAT. 1057 (1919), U. S. C.
(1925) Trr. 26, § 931, sections of the Revenue Act of 192I,42 STAT. 227 (1921).
U. S. C. (925) TIT. 26, § 1262, and section 2 of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43
STAT.253 (i924), U. S. C. (1925) TIT. 26, § 1262, provide that "when used in

this Act . . . the term 'corporation' includes associations, joint stock companies, and insurance companies." Corporations, partnerships and trusts are
designated by the statute as being each in a special status with respect to the
income tax. Partnerships as such do not pay a tax.
'The Massachusetts trust is a creation of the profession in Massachusetts
designed originally to supply a means not available under the corporation law
of that state of quasi-corporate dealings with real estate holdings; transferable
certificates of beneficial interest taking the place of stock. Their origin has
been likened in purpose to the origin of the trust of old. They have thrived so
well as to be carried into other fields where corporate advantages without the
burdensome disadvantages were desired. The field of activity of the Massachusetts trust is by no means confined to Massachusetts. For a close description, discussion and analysis, together with collection of forms see WRIGHTINGTON,

op. cit. supra note 2, passim. See also Cook, The Mysterious Massachu-

setts Trusts, (1923) 9 A. B. A. JoUP. 763; Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Business Trusts, (0923) 23 Coi- L. Rav. 423; containing, p. 424, n. 7,
a reference to some of the literature on the subject. See also Note (1926) 24
MicH. L. Ray. 599.
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NOTES

has been no little confusion in ascertaining the precise point at which
the terms of the declaration of trust contain adequate provisions to
constitute the organization an "association" and so make it taxable as
a corporation. That some rational test still remains a desideratum
in the construction of the Revenue Act is emphasized by the appearance of two recent opinions on the status of business trusts which
establish different criteria for the ascertainment of the necessary
characteristics, and which, when applied, result in different conclusions.
The case of Hornblowerv. White 1 decided that a certain operating business trust was not an association subject to the stamp tax
on the issue of stock by a corporation imposed by the Revenue Acts
of z918 and 1921. The trust involved was organized to assume the
direction of a land development company which had gotten into financial difficulties. The declaration of trust set forth that the three
trustees were to take title to the property for the purpose of reducing
it to cash within twenty years. Vacancies in the office of trustee were
to be filled by the remaining trustees. The provisions of trust could
be modified by the trustees if assented to by a majority of the certificate holders. The court distinguished the trust therein involved
from that in Hecht v. Malley 6 on the ground that "the only power
which the beneficiaries in the present case had was to assent to a
modification of the declaration of trust suggested by the trustees."
They believed such negative control did not make out of the express
trust a voluntary association under the laws of Massachusetts, 7 and
hence was not contemplated within the terms of the Revenue Acts.
Simultaneously there appeared an opinion of the General Counsel
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue 8 that a certain operating business
trust was an association within the meaning of the Revenue Acts of
r918 and X921. The body was organized under a declaration of
trust by which title to all the property to be administered in carrying out the general business projected by the terms of the trust,
was given to a single.trustee. The power to dissolve the trust, distribute earnings, or partition trust property was given unreservedly
to the trustee. The substance of the opinion is that so long as the
trust is organized for the purpose of carrying on a business for profit,
and it is conducting the business in the manner and form of a corporation, the measure of control vested and exercised by the beneficiaries is immaterial. The character of this organization that gave
it quasi-corporate form was the issuing of "negotiable certificates of
beneficial interest similar to shares of stock," and, under the counsel's
521 F. (2d) 82 (D. C. Mass. 1927).
:265 U. S. 144 (1924).
SBouchard v. First People's Trust, 253 Mass. 351, 148 N. E. 895 (925),

was cited in support.

'G. C.

M. 24o5, reported in UNITE- STATES DAILY, Oct. 19,

1927,

at 2358.
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interpretation of the case of Hecht v. Malley, the fact that there was
only one trustee did not take away the quasi-corporate form merely
because it was not possible for trustees to associate together in a
manner similar to that of directors.
It is apparent that the two opinions offer not only two different
conceptions of the term "association," but indicate two different
views of a single court decision-Hecht v. Malley. Preliminary to
any attempt to ascertain a logical gauge by which "non-association"
may be differentiated from "association" it is necessary to examine
the present state of the law as indicated by the decided cases.
The leading case on the subject, Crocker v. Malley,9 decided
that a certain holding trust (holding, in the sense that the trustees
were merely holding land and stock of a corporation which leased
the land for the collection of income and ultimate conversion into
money to be distributed to the certificate holders) was a strict trusteeship under Massachusetts law and as such could not be taxed as
an association under the revenue laws. Mr. Justice Holmes took the
existing orthodox Massachusetts view that if the shareholders have
little or no control, direct or indirect, this itidicates a trusteeship.' 0
The beneficiaries had no more than negative control in two respects,
viz., trustees had to secure their consent to fill a vacancy among the
trustees, or to modify the terms of the trust. Hence the court concluded there was not such an association among the beneficiaries as
results in joint action and interest, and of control by them over the
fund. No emphasis was laid upon the character of the activity of
the trustees-so that apparently holding tiusts would not be distinguished from operating trusts. It has been suggested by a learned
writer 11 that the test of "association as results in joint action and interest" embodies correct legal theory (since that accords with the
test adopted by courts in determining whether a business trust is to
be deemed a partnership or some other legally recognized form of
organization); while control is merely a factor in determining the
existence of the requisite association.
In Hecht v. Malley, the latest utterance1 2 of the Supreme
p249 U.
. Title &Trust
reversing
e(19),
250 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 1st, 1918). Followed
in Chicago
Co. v. Smietanka,
275 Fed. 6o CD. C. Ill. 192I) ;
Weeks
v.
Sibley,
269
Fed.
155
CD.
C.
Te2x.
920).
See also Greene County v.
Smith, 148 Ark. 33, 228 S. W. 738 (I 21).
9

SThe problem of distinguishing a trust from a partnership are frequently
been considered by Massachusetts and English courts. The easeshad
reviewed
in
the opinion
of Loring,
in Williams i59
v. Milton,
215 252
Mass.
I, 102
E. 355
Ark. 621,
S. W.
6h2N.(C923);
See also
Betts v. .,Hackathor,
(1913).
"Wells v. Mackay Telegraph-Cable Co., 239 S. W. 100i (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ;
Moorehead v. Greenville Exchange National Bank, 243 5. W. 546 (Tex. Civ.
App.
19g22).
"tRottschaefer, The Massachusetts Trust Under the Federal Tax, (1925)
25 CoL. L. REv. 305, in which appears a very lucid analysis of the whole prob-

lem. In Burk-Waggoner Assn. v. -opkins, 269 U. 5. 11o (o925), organizations like those involved in the Hecht case without further analysis were held
taxable as corGorations. For discussion of this case see infra note 24.

NOTES

Court on the characteristics of a trust that make it an association
under the acts, three Massachusetts trusts were found to be associations under the Revenue Act of 19r8. The emphasis was laid upon
two factors: the trust was operating in carrying on a business; there
existed quasi-corporate form, the significant factor in this respect to
Mr. Justice Sanford's mind being the fact that the trustees were
"associated together in much the same manner as directors in a corporation." Control by association among the beneficiaries was not
deemed a requisite since the trusts were declared to be associations
"independently of the large measure of control exercised by the beneficiaries." 13
The Hecht case purported to distinguish and not to overrule the
Crocker case,14 but some of the grounds are illy conceived, and it is
the opinion of some learned law writers that the "Hecht case indicates
a trend whose logical extension may effectually overrule the Crocker
case under the form of a limitation of its scope to cases on all fours
with it." 15 The definitive section 16 of the Act gives to corporations
a meaning that is to be applied throughout all sections of the act. The
probability being that the court will attempt to establish uniform tests
applicable under any title of the Revenue Act, it is not rational to
suppose that the test of the Crocker case will apply to income tax (for
that is the title under which that case was decided) while the test of
the Hecht case is to apply to the capital stock tax. In Malley v.
Bowditch, 7 a case involving a tax on the stock of every "association,
" Two of the trusts, the "Haymarket Trust" and the "Hecht Real Estate
Trust," would clearly be associations under the principles of the Crocker case.
In the "Massachusetts Realty Trust" there is room for more doubt, since the
only power in beneficiaries was to remove trustees, and to fill any vacancies that
occurred. But as Rottschaefer, op. cit. supra note ii,
points out, it is the reasoning more than the decision that is significant.
" The language of Sanford, 3., 265 U. S. at 16o, after stating that Crocker v.
Malley held that the act did not make a Massachusetts trust subject to a tax upon
dividends received from a Massachusetts corporation that was itself subject to
tax, is: "This opinion is based primarily upon the view that the Income Tax
Act, considering its purpose, did not show a clear intention to impose upon the
trustees as an 'association' a double liability in reference to the dividends on
stock in the corporation that itself paid an income tax, when considered as
'trustees' they were by another provision of the act exempt from such liability.
And the language used arguendo in reaching this conclusion that the trustees
could not be deemed an association unless all trustees with discretionary power
are such, and that there was no ground for grouping together the beneficiaries
and trustees in order to turn them into an association-is to be read in the light
of the trust agreement there involved, under which the trustees were in substance
merely holding property for the collection of income and its distribution among
the beneficiaries and were not engaged either by themselves or in connection
with the beneficiaries in carrying on any business."
'tRottschaefer, op. cit. supra note ii.See also opinion of WRIGHTINGTON,
op. cit. supra rn.te 2, at 55 on cases decided since Crocker v. Malley.
"Supra n,;te 3T259 Fed. 8o9 (C. C. A. Ist, 1919), distinguishing Eliot v. Freeman,
U. S. 178 (ICs;!).
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company or corporation," the court found that the operating trust involved was a "company," emphasis being placed on the fact that the
trustees were designated to carry out the business of manufacturing.
This was a step in the direction of the test apparently adopted in the
Hecht case and perhaps indicates an eventual adoption for all purposes of the tests of that case. The Treasury Department in its administrative regulations has already adopted "I them. Our problem
concerns the probability that the courts will sustain such regulations.
The eventual adoption of the tests of the Hecht case-(a) scope of
the trust activities, (b) quasi-corporate form of organization-would
have been more probable if the distinction drawn between that case
and the Crocker case had been based on a correct interpretation of the
latter's reasoning. 19 In the confusion of the decisions both the Hornblower case and the General Counsel's opinion can be plausibly maintained. The only way a rational test may be devised is by an inquiry
afresh into the logic of the situation.
A careful analysis 2 0 of the problem seems to lead to the following conclusions: Of the three possible groups involved in a trust, (a)
the trustees, (b) the beneficiaries, (c) the trustees and beneficiaries
combined, it is the characteristic of the beneficiaries solely that will
determine the status of the trust under the Revenue Act, for they are
the ones who are supposed to be the socii.1 In examining this group,

the test of "joint action and interest" of the Crocker case, though
sound because the word association itself connotes community of purpose and action, applies equally to every group of persons who act as
an entity, as for example a partnership; but all are not taxed as associations. Logically, therefore, the taxability of a group enterprise as
an association should depend on the form used to effect its group
purpose. Since the associations are taxed as corporations, their simi"Treasury Dept. Regulations under Act of 1926 (Regulations 69, Articles
15o2 and 1504). Under the regulations it is pointed out (KzxMna-zR & BAAR,
INCOME: AND WAR TAX GumE, [1927] 5529) that it is not yet definitely decided

what is the status of either (d) a trust which is not organized in quasi-corporate form and is not under the control of the beneficiaries but which is engaged in carrying on a business, or, (b) a trust which is organized in quasicorporate form but is not engaged in carrying on a business, and is not under
the control of the beneficiaries. For full discussion of the Treasury Department's former position see MONTGOMERY, INCOME TAX PROCEDURE (1924) 4448.
.See supra note 15. The incorrect interpretation of the Crocker case consists in the emphasis laid on intent not to impose double taxation. This
reason was not the basis of the Crocker case, but was merely added to show
that nothing in the tax law required the court to depart from the status found
under general principles of law.
" These conclusions stated are those that are reached by the careful study
Rottschaefer, op. cit. supra note ii.
'This is the group determined upon in William v. Milton, supra note 1o,
and Smith v. Anderson, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 247 (i88o), the leading English case.
It is the construction which best fits the Revenue Act in all its sections. It places
stockholders in a position similar to that of the beneficial certificate holders.

NOTES

larity in organization-their quasi-corporate form-should be the determinates. Of the factors in a corporation which distinguish it from a
trusteeship, 22 the significant one is the fact that the board of directors
acts as the agent for the shareholders and not, as the Hecht case
seems to imply, "that directors associate together to conduct business."
The control exerted by beneficiaries is a direct factor bearing on the
existence of this important -characteristic of quasi-corporate form.
Logically the test of "scope of activities" has no basis. A corporation is taxed equally whether it is an investment or holding body,
or business conducting body. It is the form in which the group ambition is realized that makes it amenable to the tax law, not the
nature of the ambition. Therefore the only requirement is that a
business trust have quasi-corporate form, and one of the indices of
that form is control among the beneficiaries.
The Hornblowercase, in the light of what has been said, appears
to be a correct decision. It is the reasoning of the case that is open to
objection. The first objection, not a logical one, but one of judicial
interpretation of precedent, is that the court misconstrues the Hecht
case and indicates a reaction from what seemed the trend since
the Crocker case. The second objection arises from the suggestion
in the case that only when an organization is dealt with as an association in the state of its domicile should *itbe so dealt with under
the Revenue Acts. The practical difficulty with this is that it would
add chaos to already existing confusion in states where the jurisprudence on the subject is not as highly developed as it is in Massachusetts. 28 In addition, there is the theoretical objection that the
word association as used in the act is not a technical word. All
states which have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act by statute
make an association of every partnership, yet these are not taxed as
corporations. 24 The state law regulates the incidents of organization, i. e., it decides the obligations of trustees to beneficiaries and to
third parties. But taxability is not put on the basis of these incidents.28 It is the mobilization of capital for purposes of profit in a
The important features of corporate existence are pointed out to be (i) a
division of interest in fractional shares represented by freely transferable shares,
(2) indefinite existence, (3) immediate control of enterprise by a board that
acts, in the final analysis as agent of the holders of its shares to whom it is
responsible, (4) enforcement of that responsibility through formal group action,
(5) ultimate control of the enterprise by shareholders, secured through group
action.
There is no uniformity among the decisions of the states, or even within
a given state. See WRiGHTINGToN, op. cit. supra note 2, § 13.

"It is apparent that the word as used in the Uniform Partnership Act is
not the same as in the Revenue Act. In criticism of the former see Crane, Uniform PartnershipAct, (I915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 762.
"' Cf. Burk-Waggoner Assn. v. Hopkins, supra note 12. The contention made
in this case was that the trust had been declared a partnership in Texas and
hence not liable to taxation. But the court held that §§ 218 (a) and 335 (c)refer
only to ordinary partnerships and that within the Act this trust was an asso-
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certain form that gives the impulse to tax, and the treatment by the
Federal Government of that form cannot be affected by the states'
treatment.
The Opinion of General Counsel was concerned primarily with
the sole trustee who carried on the business. In deciding that the existence of a single trustee was not incompatible with the existence of
quasi-corporate form, there was a logical departure from the inferences arising from the language, and from the language itself, of the
Hecht case. In theory the decision is correct and enlightening because it emphasizes the fact that even though there are no corporations which have but a single director, it is not the associating
together of directors that is a significant factor of corporate existence. As has been explained, it is the acting as agent for a group to
whom the agent is responsible that marks corporate form. Practically considered, the decision destroys what would be an easy method
for. preventing the application of the law to a trust which legitimately
falls within the terms of the act structurally- considered. The objection to the opinion is that it adopts the "scope of activities" test of the
Hecht case. This, as has been shown, bears no relation to quasicorporate form, and though it definitely represents the attitude of the
administrative officials it may well be disregarded by courts in the
future.
In conclusion it might be noted that as a matter of statutory
construction the courts need feel very little hampered by the terms
of the Act. Association, undefined, is sufficiently nebulous a term as
to include any organization involving a number of persons who seek
as a group to accomplish an object that may result in profit to them
individually. Business trusts are being increasingly regulated along
the lines of corporations. 26 The problem before the Supreme Court
when it arises will be more a problem of taxation policy than of judicial interpretation.
J.R.C.
ciation. The language of Brandeis, J., 269 U. S. at 114, is conclusive on the question under consideraion. "But nothing in the Constitution precludes Congress
from taxing as a corporation an association which, although unincorporated,
transacts its business as if it were incorporated. The power of Congress so to
tax associations is not affected by the fact that, under the law of a particular
State, the association cannot hold title to property, or that its shareholders are
individually liable for the association's debts, or that it is not recognized as a
legal entity. Neither the conception of unincorporated associations prevailing
under the local law, nor the relation under that law of the association to its
shareholders, nor their relation to each other and to outsiders, is of legal significance as bearing upon the power of Congress to determine how and at what rate
the income of the joint enterprise shall be taxed."
, See an interesting note on the recent case which upheld the right of a state
to regulate constitutionally a foreign trust doing business in that state. (1927) 41
'HARv. L. REv. 86.

NOTES

PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS-It
is not at all surprising that as a result of the constant efforts being
made to apprehend the violators of the prohibition laws the courts are
often called upon to declare what shall constitute a sufficient showing
of probable cause to justify the issuance of search warrants.
The Constitutiori of the United States, in upholding the cherished
rights of the people to security against unreasonable searches and
seizures, provides in the Fourth Amendment, that
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." 1
This provision of the Federal Constitution appears in the same or
in slightly varying language in all the state constitutions. Everywhere, then, throughout the United States, it is a condition precedent
to the issuance of a search warrant that it be founded "upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation."
Probable cause is usually defined as
"a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves, to warrant a discreet and prudent man in believing that a crime is being or has been committed." 2
The question has often arisen whether this constitutional requirement that "no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation" is satisfied by an affidavit or complaint which
alleges that the affiant "has reason to believe and'does believe" that an
offense is being committed. There is a definite split of authority on
this question, the majority opinion being that the issuance of a search
warrant on the basis of such a complaint is violative of the constitutional provision in question,3 since no opportunity is given to the magistrate or judge to determine whether the complainant's belief is
grounded on circumstances sufficient to constitute the probable cause
contemplated by the constitution. This view is based on the reasoning that the ascertainment of probable cause is a matter for judicial
determination, and that the judicial officer must therefore have before
The prohibition of the Federal Constitution against unreasonable searches
and seizures applies only to the Federal Government, and is not a limitation
upon the powers of the states. i CooLFY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIoNs (8th
ed. 1927) 617, n.

'U. S. v. Lepper, 288 Fed. 36, 138 (D. C. N. Y. 1923); 2 BouviER,
(x897) 763.
'Smoot v. State, I6o Ga. 744, 128 S. E. 909 (1925); Wallace v. State,
,57 N. E. 657 (Ind. 1927) ; COOLEY, Op. cit. .supra note 2, at 618.
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him the facts from which the complainant formed his belief, so that
he, and not the latter, may exercise his judgment on the sufficiency of
the ground shown for such belief.
"The whole case upon which a search warrant issues must
be made by him who prays for such a writ. The judicial officer
before whom an application for a search warrant is filed must
exercise his judicial power to determine whether or not a warrant
shall issue; such judicial function can be moved only by the facts
brought before him, which are under oath or affirmation. A
warrant to search and seize, which follows upon a statement
based solely upon the belief of the affiant, rests upon the reasoning of the affiant, based upon the secret facts of Which he may
have knowledge, and the conclusion which results from such reasoning is affiant's, not that of the judicial officer. The judicial
process to ascertain probable cause is then transferred from the
judicial officer to the affiant. The constitution permits no such
thing." I
The other line of authority supports the doctrine that the magistrate is justified in issuing a warrant upon an affidavit of information
and belief without any supporting testimony of the truth of the allegation.5 The courts favoring this result uphold the different state
statutes prescribing (i) what shall constitute a sufficient showing of
probable cause and (2) that upon the filing of an affidavit that the
complainant "has reason to believe and does believe" that the one
accused has intoxicating liquor in his possession

.

.

.

a warrant

shall issue without any further inquiry or finding by the magistrate.6
The majority view appears to be both saferi and more logical, for
to permit the complainant's belief to serve as the measure of probable
cause is to have no fixed standard at all. In order to give to the citizen a real guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures we
must interpose between him and rash and unreliable accusers the judgment of a judicial officer selected by the state.
Many state legislatures have enacted special statutes which reach
the result of the majority view. The Federal Statute governing
search warrants, which is perhaps more definite and stringent than
'Wallace v. State, supra note 3 at 66I.
5
Rosanski v. State, io6 Ohio St 442, 14o N. E. 370
Kees, 92 W. Va. 277, 114 S. E. 617
'

(1922);

State v. Kees, supra note 5. Contra: State v. Peterson,

194 Pac. 342 (i92o).

State v.

(1922).
27

Wyo. 185,

The statutes here discussed usually read as follows:

"If any person shall make an affidavit before any justice of the peace or judge
of any court that such affiant has reason to believe, does believe, that on any
described or designated premises or tract of land, there is intoxicating liquor
or a still or distilling apparatus which is being sold, bartered, used, or given
away, or possessed, in violation of the laws of this state, such justice of the
peace, . . . shall issue his warrant to any officer having power to serve
,criminal processes, and cause the premises designated in such affidavit to be
searched . . . "

NOTES

some of the state statutes provides, in general, (i) for the examination of the complainant and witnesses, (2) for affidavits or written
depositions setting forth the facts upon which the application is
claimed, and (3) that probable cause be established to the satisfaction
of the judge or commissioner.7
The Constitution of Pennsylvania, in its first article, provides
that
"the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant, to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall
issue, without describing them as nearly as may be, or without
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by
the affiant."
Under this constitutional provision the Pennsylvania legislature
in 1923 passed a statute which provides for the issuance of search
warrants under the following rules:
"Whenever any individual makes complaint in writing before
any alderman, justice of the peace, or magistrate, supported by his
oath or affirmation and subscribed to by him, alleging that there
is probable cause to believe, and that he has just and reasonable
grounds for believing, and does believe, that intoxicating liquor is
said complaint describunlawfully manufactured, sold ....
ing the said place or thing to be searched, and the thing or things
to be seized, as nearly as may be, and setting forth probable cause,
if it be made to appear that
.
.
*.
. the said alderman
there is probable cause for such belief, shall issue a warrant to
"8
.
search . . . and seize
In interpreting and applying this section of the statute the Superior Court of Penns~lvania has declared that it is necessary to the
validity of a search warrant that
'The provision of the Federal Statute on this point is "(i) The judge or
commissioner must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, and require their affidavits or take their
depositions in writing and cause them to be subscribed by the parties making
them. (2) The affidavits or depositions must set forth the facts tending to
establish the grounds of the application or probable cause for believing that
they exist. (3) If the judge or commissioner is thereupon satisfied of the
existence of the grounds of the application or that there is probable cause
to believe their existence, he must issue a search warrant . . . " 4o STAT.
228 (1g7), U. S. C. (1925) Trr. 18, §§614-616.
"Act of March 27, 1923, P. L. 34, §8, PA. STAT. (West, 1924 Supp.)
§ 14098a-8. A proviso to this section specifies that "no search warrant shall
issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such, unless it is being used

for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part used for

some business purpose, such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, boarding house, warehouse, or public garage."
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(i) It should contain an allegation by the affiant that there is
probable cause to believe, and that he has just and reasonable grounds

for his belief.
(2) The facts upon which the affiant bases his belief and from
which the judicial officer must find probable cause must be alleged.
(3) It should be made to appear to the proper official that there
is probable cause for the affiant's belief before the issuance of such
search warrant.'
The only question now remaining seems to be whether the complaint sets forth sufficient facts to persuade the magistrate that the
belief was reasonable.
In Commonwealth v. Schwartz 'o the court upheld the sufficiency
of a sworn complaint, upon which a search warrant was issued, in
which the affiant stated, inter alia, that "there is probable cause to
believe and that he has just and reasonable grounds for believing and
does believe . . ." and, that "he has been informed by credible
persons that they have bought from the defendant intoxicating liquor
at the place hereinafter described and from his own observation is
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
In finding the complaint valid the court further says:
"The affiant is not restricted to violations of law within his
own knowledge nor is he bound to set forth the names of witnesses or the details as to what they would testify. Probable
cause does not import absolute certainty. It only implies reasonable grounds for belief, and the justice issuing the search warrant
is the authority to be satisfied that probable cause exists."
It is interesting to note, however, that the court, by way of
dictum, declares itself as of the opinion that had it not been for the
specific provision in the act that the complaint should set forth the
grounds showing probable cause, it would have been sufficient for the
affiant to make affidavit that there is probable cause to believe, and
that he has just and reasonable grounds for believing and does
believe, etc. 1
This enlightening enunciation thus indicates that but for the
special statute now existing in Pennsylvania the courts would most
likely have added their weight to the minority view heretofore discussed.
"Corn. v. Schwartz, 82 Pa. Super. 369 (1923) ; Com. v. Patrick Scanlon,
84 Pa. Super. 569 (1925).

"Supra note 9. Cited with approval in Com. v. Hunsinger, 89 Pa. Super.
238 (1926).

'The court continues: "The same provision of the constitution which protects the people from unreasonable searches also protects them from unreasonable arrests, and yet it was held in Commonwealth v. Green, i8s Pa. 641
(1898), that an information is sufficient to support a warrant of arrest where
the affiant affirms to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, which
is certainly no stronger than the words from the act above quoted."

NOTES
It is important at this point to observe that in those jurisdictions

where it is held that evidence, though obtained by an illegal search and
seizure, may be admitted, the question of the validity of the search
warrant is immaterial where
the admissibility of the evidence obtained
2
thereunder is involved.1
The courts of Pennsylvania are committed to the rule that the
admissibility of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means
through which it was obtained, and "the court will not suspend the
conduct of a trial to enter into a collateral inquiry as to the means
through which the evidence, otherwise competent, was obtained." 's
In addition to this the Pennsylvania Act of 1923 provides that:
"No property rights shall exist in any intoxicating liquor or
property designed for the manufacture or sale of intoxicating
liquor intended for use in violating any of the provisions of this
act, or which has been so used, but, upon possession or use of any
such intoxicating liquor or property in violation of this act, the
same shall be deemed contraband and shall be forfeited to the
Commonwealth." 14

Therefore, the courts in applying these. rules hold that though the
evidence in the hands of the state was secured by means of a search
warrant which was defective, either because probable cause was not
properly set forth or because the search warrant did not properly
designate the place to be searched, or for some other reason, yet if the
goods were unlawfully used, the defendant, as against the Common-

wealth, could have no right to them and therefore they could be
admitted in evidence against him. 15

Perhaps it is true that one who violates the law should not receive
the protection of the law, but nevertheless, from *thestandpoint of the

constitution which endeavors to uphold the sanctity of the home
against unreasonable searches and seizures, such a doctrine which per-

mits the use of evidence obtained under an illegal search warrant,
causes one to wonder how much truth there is in the oft quoted
phrase, "a man's house is his castle." 16

N.L.E.
"The Supreme Court of the United States and about half the state courts
have declared that evidence obtained from one accused of crime by an officer
or agent of the government, by means of an illegal search and seizure, is 'not
admissible in a criminal action against the accused. In about an equal number of states such evidence is admissible. CooLnY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 632.
" Com. v. Schwartz, supra note 9.
Act of March 27, 1923, supra note 8, § ii (West, .§ 14o98a-ui).
Com. v. One Box Containing Benedictine, 89 Pa. Super. 467 (1926);
Com. v. Hunsinger, supra note io.
" "Que le meason de chescun est a luy come son castle & fortres . . .
Semayne's Case, 5 Coke gia (1407).
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WRIT OF Quo WARRANTO AS APPLIED TO CRIMINAL ACTS OF

CoiRoxrIoNs-The history of the writ of quo warranto reveals a
constant tendency to increase its scope to include many situations for
which, originally, it was not intended. In the beginning, available to
the king or the government as a prerogative remedy, in later times, a
private relator could also employ it, if the interest concerned were of
a public nature.' England early decided that for the holding of a
corporate office to be of such a nature, it had to be an office of a public
corporation. In the United States, the writ was held to lie also
against offices of private corporations. 2
-The tendency to increase the scope of the action is illustrated in a
striking manner in the recent case of Commonwealth ex rel. Woodruff
8
v. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia.
The defendant, a corporation, organized for playing baseball for profit, held a game on
Sunday, a violation of the Act of x794,4 which prohibits worldly employment on Sunday, and provides a fine for every offense. An action
of .quo warranto was instituted against the baseball club, in which it
was contended that playing baseball on Sunday, being a crime, was an
act outside their authority and charter powers. The court held
that the action was proper, and, in the face of a strong dissenting
opinion, "ousted" the club from playing Sunday baseball. Mr. Justice Schaffer said for the court: 5
"We can think of no instance in which the attorney general
can move with greater propriety to fulfil his duty . . . than
in such an instance as the one before us, where one of the state's
creatures avows its right and power to nullify a criminal statute.
There is, and could be no implied power in a corporation to violate an act of the Assembly."
Admittedly, quo warranto lies in cases of nonfeasance or abuse
of powers by a corporation, and forfeiture may be declared where
there is a wilful nonuser, misuser, or a usurpation of powers not
granted by the charter.6 Further, where a corporation exercises a
franchise to which it has no lawful right, the court may oust it from

'HIGH,

EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REmEEs (3d ed. 1896) § 6o2.
'HIGH, op. cit. supra note I, § 653. The theory of the American courts is
that any corporation chartered or organized under the laws of a state, is public
in character, and any usurpation of charter powers in an abuse of the state's
privilege.
3290 Pa. 136, 138 Atl.
497 (927).
'Act of April 22, 1794, 3 Sms. L. 177, § I, PA. STAT. (West, ig2o) § 20252.
290 Pa. at 145, 138 AtI. at Soo. A dictum in Kenton v. Union Passenger
Co., 54 Pa. 401, was cited in support: "The company's violation of the Sunday
law can be redressed only by enforcing the statutory penalty, or by proceeding in
behalf of the commonwealth, against the company for misuse or abuse of its
charter."

'FERRis,

EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIEs (1926)

§140.

NOTES

such exercise, without affecting the corporate franchise.' But it was
contended by the defendant that the writ does not lie in the principal
case, because the Act provided the sole penalty for the Act's viola-

tion. In support of this claim, Chief Justice Moschzisker, dissenting,
said: 8

"The penalty and.also the appropriate remedy are provided
in distinct terms by the Act of X794 itself. If it is not a sufficient deterrent, it is for the legislature to provide another."
Certain authorities indicate, however, that such is not the
general rule. Quo warranto, being a civil remedy, is applicable
in a civil proceeding against a corporation, even though the acts complained of, also constitute a violation of criminal statutesY The
court in State ex rel. Langer v. Gamble-Robinson Fruit Co. 10 treated
the subject at length and held that even a provision in the penal code
for a cancellation of the defendant's charter, if the law were violated,
did not prevent a civil remedy in quo warranto, brought for the same
purpose. The court said:
"The provision under the penal statute for annulment does
not evidence a legislative intention to make the criminal remedy
exclusive. A civil remedy may be' brought independently of
it. . . . The writ tries the right of the corporation further to hold its franchise privileges, not the question of guilt
or innocence under the statute."
And this would appear to be the rule,"1 despite cases quoted by
the minority, that where a penal remedy is provided for violations
of the Sunday law, in the form of a fine, such violations are neither
indictable 12 nor to be restrained by equity.'8
'A distinction is to be noted between the acts of a corporation which are
usurpations of a franchise not granted, and acts which are ultra vires, but do
not usurp a corporate power. 2 BAiIEY, HAE.AS CoRPus AND SPEcIA.L REMEDIES (1913), § 347.
8290 Pa. at 152,

138 Atl. at 5oi.
'Fiaas, op. cit. supra note 6, §iio.
044 N. Dak. 376, 384 et seq., 176 N. W. IO3, 1O5 et seq. (I919). See also
State v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 34, 98 S. W. 539 (i9o6) ; Com. v. Smith,
271 Pa. 523, II5 Adt. 887 (1922) (mandamus).

' But see Com. v. Newport Turnpike Co., 29 Ky. 1285, 97 S. W. 375 (19o6)
where the court refused to forfeit a corporate charter by quo warranto proceedings, for charging excess tolls, because this was also a violation of a criminal
law which provided adequate remedy. And in the principal case Kephart, J., dissenting, declared that the Pennsylvania Act of March 21, I8o6, 4 Sms. L. 332,
construed in Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa. 511, IO9 At. 786 (I92O), made
the proceeding under the Act of 1794, supra note 4, an exclusive remedy.
" Com. ex rel. Barr v. Naylor, 34 Pa. 86 (i859) (Sale of liquor on Sunday).
4
" Co. v. Smith, supra note ii. (Bill to restrain Park Commissioners from
permitting Sunday baseball.)
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The difficulty with the majority opinion in the principal case,
exists, it seems, in the fact that the offense of playing Sunday baseball
is not in excess of the defendant's charter powers, unless any violation of law is an excess. If any violation of criminal law is in excess
of charter powers, quo warranto would acquire a scope that it appears
never previously to have had. For up to this time, more than a
slight violation of law, whether civil or criminal, has been needed;
and the writ with its verdict of ouster, will not be acted upon unless
the corporation's misuser has been a substantial one.14 It is important
that the cause for the infliction of an ouster upon a corporation, either
in whole, or in part, should be one that the law considers of a very
serious nature. 5
An examination of cases in which the usurpation consisted of a
criminal act and for which the charter was forfeited by quo warranto
proceedings, fails to support the decision in the principal case. In a
series of cases the acts complained of were that the corporations in
question had made agreements for the formation of pools and trusts
in restraint of trade. In one 'I the defendant, organized for distilling
alcohol, sold out to other corporations to create a monopoly. In
another ' 7 the defendant conspired to form a pool for the purpose of
fixing the price of beef within the state. In a third 's there existed a
combination of the defendants and others to settle the price of fruit,
contrary to the penal code of the state. In all of them, such combinations being illegal, both by common law and by statute, it was held
that quo warranto could be properly brought. But in all these cases,
the illegal acts were also in excess of charter powers, the ultra vires
acts consisting in these defendants permitting themselves to be controlled by agreements with others, which were far from their intended
purposes when created. In State v. Nebraska Distilling Co."9 it was
said:
"A corporation can only be organized under our laws for a
lawful purpose, and any act done by such a corporation for the
accomplishment of a purpose, not lawful, is in excess of its
powers."
A different type of law violation is to be found in First National
Bank of St. Louis v. Missouri.' The defendant, a federal bank, vioop. cit. supra note i, § 649.
" Com. v. Monongahela Bridge Co., 216 Pa. io8, 64 Atl. gg (19o6).
a State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700, 46 N. W. i55 (i89o).
' HIGH,

"' State v. Armour Packing Co., 173 Mo. 356, 73 S. W. 645 (1903).
'* State v. Gamble-Robinson Co., supra note io.
See also the following
cases in which the form of action was not discussed: People v. Milk Exchange,
145 N. Y. 267, 39 N. E. io62 (i895) ; People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130
Ill. 268, 22 N. E. 798 (1889) ; Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, i56 Ill. 448, 41

N. E. I88 (1895).

Supra note 16.
U. S.640 (1924).
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NOTES

lated the state law forbidding the creation of branch banks. Similarly,
in First National Bank v. Union Trust Co.,21 the defendant federal
bank exercised a privilege given to it by the federal law to act as
executor and administrator of stocks and bonds. This was contrary
to the state law of Michigan. Apart from the question of the power
of the state laws over federal banks, 22 it was held in both cases that
quo warranto was the proper means to test the right of the banks so
to act. But here again, it would appear that the acts were more
than merely illegal; they were acts usurping powers not originally
intended for them--in short, ultra vires acts of a substantial nature.
In State ex rel. Monnett v. Capital City Dairy Co.,23 the defendant company had a charter to manufacture and sell oleomargarine.
In so doing they made the product and wrapped it to appear to be an
imitation of butter. This was a violation of the state health laws to
prevent deception in the sale of dairy products. Although the criminal laws provided other punishment, it was held quo warranto lay
to oust it from its charter, for what the court considered in excess
of franchised powers. And it was said in State v. Deimr Jockey
Club 24 (the case was not decided on this point) that a corporation
formed to promote a county fair and hold pools for bookmaking,
might forfeit its charter by quo warranto proceedings for selling
pools to minors, which was expressly forbidden by law.
These two cases illustrate, perhaps, the closest approach to the
decision in the principal case. 25 All three increase the use of the
civil writ of quo warranto to an unprecedented extent. Not the performance of every unlawful act will constitute an abuse of privileges. 26 One is constrained to agree with Mr. Justice Kephart, dissenting in the principal case: 27
"The appellant was organized and chartered to play baseball. The power to perform its corporate function is there, but
playing on a particular day is penalized. ." . . If the legislature should see fit to remove the penalty, no new steps would
be necessary to enable the club to play on Sunday. The appellant did what was within its corporate powers."
This most clearly indicates the distinction between the principal
case and, with the single possible exception of State v. Capital City
=244 U. S. 416 (1917).

'For discussion of this point, see (1925) 23 MIcH. L. REV. 291.
=62 Ohio St. 350, 57 N. E. 62 (i9oo).
"Supra note io.
"See State v. Nashville Baseball Club, ig Tenn. 292, 154 S. W. 1151
(913). Quo warranto proceedings were brought to prevent the violation of
the Sunday laws, by the defendant club. The court found the Sunday laws
unconstitutional, failing to discuss* the procedure used.
"4BAmavy, op. cit. supra note 7 at 1335.

W29o Pa. at i5o, 138 AtI. at 5o3.
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Dairy Co., 8 all the others cited. And it also propounds the most
feasible test of whether or not the act in question is a usurpation of
privileges: Would the corporation possess the right to do the act
complained of if the statute making it a crime were removed? If it
would, then the act is neither ultra vires nor a usurpation of a franchise. To permit quo warranto to lie nevertheless, would result in
subjecting corporations to be harrassed for a multitude of petty, illegal acts.29 Mr. Justice Kephart strikes the true note, as to this, when
he says :0
"Under the majority opinion, corporations that sell or print
newspapers on Sunday ought to be proceeded against [by quo
warranto] ; telephone and telegraph companies which furnish the
news are included. Indeed, if this entirely new flexible remedy
is upheld as the law, it becomes the open gateway for punishment
for all corporate violators of the law, be it the Sunday law or
other laws. Manufacturing establishments which do not prop.erly guard machinery,

.

.

.

concerns with large buildings

and hotel companies not properly equipped with fire escapes,
. . . companies that happen to employ labor illegally or
work them over time, all may be proceeded against by quo warranto."

The result, undoubtedly, of such an extension of the writ, would
be to degrade what was originally a prerogative remedy, exclusively,
into an action for petty and minor affairs. In view of the fact that
far more common and reasonable actions exist to remedy such situations, the extension is neither feasible nor desirable.
M.M.P.
RIGHT OF A DEFENDANT IN AN ACTION AGAINST

Him IN His

PERSONAL CAPACITY BY A RECEIVER TO SET OFF DEBTS OwED

Him

Supreme Court of North
Carolina has recently handed down a decision on a comparatively
rare phase of the doctrine of set-off in the case of Coburn v. Carstarphen.' The defendant, a county treasurer, was indebted to a bank on
two personal notes. In the bank he had a personal account, also
moneys of the county in his name as treasurer. He was personally
IN

A REPRESENTATIVE

CAPACITY-The

liabl to the county for the money that had come into his hands. The
bank knew that the funds deposited by him as treasurer were trust
Supra note

23.

'See State v. Regents of University, 55 Kan. 389, 40 Pac. 656 (1895)
where quo warranto proceedings lay to prevent the charging of a five dollar,
library fee in a free state university.
0290 Pa. at i5O, 138 AtI. at 503.
2 139 S. E. 596 (N. C. 927).

NOTES

funds. The bank became insolvent, and its receiver 2 sued on the
defendant's personal notes. The court held that the defendant was
entitled to set off both his personal deposits 8 and those made by him
as trustee against the plaintiff's claim.
When considering any application of the doctrine of set-off, it is
well to bear in mind the historical background. At common law, setoff was unknown-If A owed B Lio on one contract, while B owed
A £io on another, the set-off would be unavailing, and either one
might get a £IO judgment against the other. 4 In chancery the principle of set-off arose to avoid multiplicity of actions 5 and many years
8
later, courts of law by statute were enabled to allow the remedy.
But, although in law set-off is a purely statutory creature, statutes in the various jurisdictions both here and in England 7 are, for
the most part, strikingly similar. Generally the requirement is that
the debts be mutual, and owing in the same right." In equity the
rules are more flexible, since many persons may be made parties to a
bill, and the decree framed to accomplish a short cut to a just allinclusive settlement. Courts of law, in the interpretation of their
statutes, have been much affected by the willingness of equity to apply
set-offs without a strict regard for mutuality. A fortiori, the law
courts are less strict where they have been given part or full equitable
powers.
With regard to the requirement of mutuality, it has generally
been held that one cannot set off debts due him as trustee when being
sued in his individual capacity,10 nor can the plaintiff apply the same,
for the crossing debts are not due in the same right. 1 In personal suit
The receiver sues under the same rights as his insolvent. He is not a purchaser for value, and acquires no greater rights than his transferror. People v.
California Trust Co., 168 Cal. 241, 141 Pac. 1181 (1914); 23 R. C. L. 56;
MoasE, BANKS AND BANKING (5th ed. 1917) 633..
'The remainder of this note does not discuss the right of a depositor to set

off his personal account against debts of the insolvent bank. His right to do so
seems now so well settled as to be indisputable. 3 R. C. L. 529, 647; 4 R. C. L.
655; 7 C. J. 652; and see (1915) 3 V.& L. REV. 72. For a brief summary of
this development see (1915) 13 MicH L. REv. 512.
'McLean v. McLean,

1 Conn. 397 (1815).

rAN,
LAW OF SET-oFs (1869)

IO.

See also 34 Cyc. 636; WA=-

'34 Cyc. 633; WATERMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, 17.
S34 CYc. 636. For a comprehensive study see Lloyd, Development of Setoff, (1916) 64 U.*OF PA. L. REV. 541.
'Although a very few set-off statutes existed in the Colonies before passed
by the English Parliament, most such American statutes are patterned upon 2
GEo. II c. 22, perpetuated by 8 GEo. II, c. 24, §4. 34 Cyc. 622. See also article,

64 U. oF PA. L. REV. supra note 6.
*Fidelity Co. v. Poe, 147 Md. 502,

128 AUt. 465 (1925) ; See also Weiss v.
Wahl, 5 Mo. App. 408 (1878) ; 34 Cyc. 712 et seq. and cases cited.
'See WATERMAN, op. cit. supra note 2, 4, 25.

"Middleton v. Pollock, L. R. 20 Eq. 29 (Eng. 1875). But see Wolf v.
Beales, 6 Serg. & R. 242 (Pa. 192o) ; WATERMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, 45.
tt MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING (5th ed. 1917) § 334, and note 2.
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against an executor or administrator, the defendant cannot set off
debts due the estate,12 and a public officer is not permitted to plead
a debt due him in his official capacity, when being sued on a personal
obligation.13
Then why, if at all, should the defendant be allowed greater
freedom when sued by the receiver of an insolvent? Some courts
answer that insolvency is a special equity which justifies application
of a different rule, 14 and the majority seem to allow the set-off.' 5 One
of the few authorities in point is an early New York case' 8 in which
a city official had deposited a fund partly his own, partly the city's in
the now insolvent bank. In a decision citing very little precedent 17
he was allowed to set off this account against his personal debt to the
bank. In a later New York case Is the Supreme Court allowed one
sued as trustee by the receiver of an insolvent bank to set off his
individual claim against the bank, but the decision was reached by
reliance on the admittedly broader wording of an intervening statute, 9
and the seeming exclusive 'reliance placed thereon,
might seem to in20
dicate that the general law was otherwise.
A Pennsylvania case, citing no authority,2- contains language
implying that a set-off should not be allowed under such circumstances as existed in the Coburn case. The court allowed one who
had carried a deposit of trust funds in his own name, as "X, assignee"
to set off this amount against an insolvent bank, on an individual
debt, but the court laid great stress on the bank's apparent lack of
knowledge as to who was the cestui que trust, and assumed that addition of the word "assignee" did not give notice of a special fund.
They practically treated this as a personal account of the defendant.
Judging from their language, the court might have decided otherwise
if the bank had known the exact nature of the deposit, as the bank
'Farris

v. Houston, 78 Ala.

250

(1884); People v. California Trust Co.,

supra note 2; 34 Cyc. 722.

' Bayliss v. Pearson, 15 Iowa 279 (1863) ; 34 Cyc. 723.
"Hamilton v. Van Hook, 26 Tex. 6o2 (1862) ; 34 Cyc. 633.
U

See note 25, infra.

"Miller v. Receiver of Franklin Bank, i Paige 444 (N. Y. 1829).
' Only two earlier cases, both English, were cited.
One of these related
only to settling of estates, and the other to settling of partnership business after
death of one partner.
1
'Pandergast v. Greenfield, 4o Hun 489 (N. Y. 1886).
New York Code of Civil Procedure, §501, as re-enacted 1877.
'A still later New York case of People v. German Bank, 116 App. Div.
607, affirmed without opinion 192 N. Y. 533; 84 N. E. 117 (I9O8), is cited in 5
A. L. R. 84 and 7 C. J. 745 as contrary to the above rule of the Miller case.
There is dictum to that effect, but the court distinguished it on the ground that
the defendant had no personal interest in the fund as he did in the earlier case.
However, it seems a very real distinction lies in that the deposit in the latter
case was owed to three trustees jointly, and was attempted to be set off in a suit
where only one of them was a party defendant.
"Laubach v. Leibert, 87 Pa. 55 (1878).

NOTES
knew it in the Coburn case. Cases and dicta in Pennsylvania up until
very recently have been in seeming conflict and clouded with uncertainty. Upon the very same authorities the Superior and Supreme
Courts of this state reached opposite conclusions. In the case of
Hunter v. Hemming,22 the plaintiff was receiver of an insolvent
bank, and sued the defendant on personal notes. The defendant admitted liability, but attempted to set off two accounts which he had
in the bank, one in his name as "Executor of the will of A"; the other
as "Trustee for J." The trial court refused to allow the set-off; the
.Superior Court allowed it, only to be reversed by the Supreme Court,
which said:
"The manifest effect of allowing such a set-off would be
to enable a debtor to pay a debt of his own with money belonging to other people. This cannot receive judicial sanction."
Under such a clear and recent decision on the point, it seems reasonable to conclude that the set-off would not be permitted in Pennsylvania today.
A perusal of those cases which allow the set-off shows courts
have been influenced by an argument that the set-off should be applied provided the rights of third persons are not injured. Frequently there are found implications and expressions to that effect.
But, of necessity, are not the rights of others always affected? There
will be less in assets of the insolvent for distribution, with the result
that creditors will be proportionately cut off. Courts answer by saying that to allow the set-off merely settles the account between those
having legal title. It is submitted that this is not a sufficient answer,
for as was seen, statutes generally require that the debts be owed
in the same right, so if the remedy be allowed at all, it must be on
equitable grounds independent of law. But, by hypothesis, courts
applying equitable doctrines should look to the parties having beneficial interest, rather than to those with bare legal title. In these
insolvency cases, some innocent party loses, so it might be better and
more logical to refuse the set-off, 28 for the equities seem at least
balanced, if not in favor of the creditors at large of the insolvent.
If, as in the principal case, the trustee is absolutely liable, as
opposed to the usual liability of the trustee,24 for any loss which may
occur to the fund, this point might be sufficient to warrant a different
conclusion, but while the court at some length discussed the defendant's responsibility for all moneys received, the decision does not seem
tq be put squarely on that ground. Most of the other cases cited fail
"2259 Pa. 347, io3 Atl. 6i (i918), reversing 64 Pa. Super. Ct 366 (i9i6).
It is interesting to note the review of cases given by both courts, and note how
the same authorities are relied on for opposite conclusions.
" In view of the argument that law adheres to strict mutuality, and equity
should take cognizance of only the beneficial ownership.
SPERRY, TRusTs (6th ed. 1911) § 443-5.
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even to indicate the extent of the trustee's liability. Where mentioned
at all, the point is disposed of in a sentence or two. It is submitted
that this liability is of importance. The causes so often advanced
for refusing the set-off, unfair preference over other creditors,
and permitting defendant to pay his own debts with another's money,
are not present. If the defendant cannot avail himself of the right,
the direct loss is his. The relation between him and his cestui que
trust assumes also the nature of debtor and creditor. Then does
not the fund so far become his own that for the purpose of this kind
of case one can say that the fund is his, and debts between the plaintiff and defendant are mutual?
On this fact, it seems, the Coburn case is distinguishable from
the others, but unfortunately courts have not in their decisions shown
whether this point may be a controlling factor. Independently of it,
the majority allow a trustee to set off debts owed him in a representative capacity, where the plaintiff represents an insolvent. 25
I. F.H.
Funk v. Young, Trustee, 138 Ark. 38, 210 S. W. 143 (igig), with annotation and cases cited, 5 A. L. R. 79.

